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Abstract—It is critical to secure the Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT) devices because of potentially devastating con-
sequences in case of an attack. Machine learning (ML) and
big data analytics are the two powerful leverages for analyz-
ing and securing the Internet of Things (IoT) technology. By
extension, these techniques can help improve the security of
the IIoT systems as well. In this paper, we first present com-
mon IIoT protocols and their associated vulnerabilities. Then,
we run a cyber-vulnerability assessment and discuss the utiliza-
tion of ML in countering these susceptibilities. Following that,
a literature review of the available intrusion detection solutions
using ML models is presented. Finally, we discuss our case
study, which includes details of a real-world testbed that we
have built to conduct cyber-attacks and to design an intrusion
detection system (IDS). We deploy backdoor, command injec-
tion, and Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attacks
against the system and demonstrate how a ML-based anomaly
detection system can perform well in detecting these attacks. We
have evaluated the performance through representative metrics
to have a fair point of view on the effectiveness of the methods.
Index Terms—Cyber attack, Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT), intrusion detection, machine learning (ML), network
security, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA),
vulnerability assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PRIMARY concept of the Industrial Internetof Things (IIoT) is to take advantage of Internet
of Things (IoT) technology in the industrial control
systems (ICSs). ICSs are an integral part of critical infras-
tructures and have been utilized for a long time to supervise
industrial machines and processes. They perform real-time
monitoring and interacting with the devices, real-time col-
lection and analysis of the data, and also logging of all the
events that happen in the industrial systems. Utilizing IoT
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Fig. 1. SCADA architecture.
technology in these systems enhances the network intelligence
and security in the optimization and automation of industrial
processes.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
system is the largest subset of an ICS. It provides
a graphical user interface (GUI) through its human–machine
interface (HMI). The HMI makes it easy for the operators to
observe the status of the system, interact with the IIoT devices,
and receive alarms indicating abnormal behaviors. A general
scheme of SCADA systems is shown in Fig. 1.
As shown in this figure, these systems consist of four dif-
ferent subsystems; I/O network, supervisory control, control
network, and corporate network. I/O network consists of the
deployed IIoT devices (including sensors and actuators) in the
industrial process. Supervisory control is the main subsystem
responsible for securing, controlling, and monitoring the IIoT
devices. The control network includes programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) that directly sense and manage the physical
processes. Since the sensors and actuators cannot communi-
cate directly, PLCs are used to collect the sensed data and send
commands to the actuators. Finally, the corporate network con-
sists of servers, computers, and other users connected to the
network for other general services such as file transfer, Website
hosting, mail servers, resource planning, etc.
ICSs are mostly mission-critical systems with high-
availability requirements. Their continuous operations lead to
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producing a huge amount of data that can be managed through
big data analytics. In the past, these systems were standalone
and isolated from the world, making them unsusceptible to
external malicious attacks. Recently, increased connectivity of
ICS with corporate networks and utilization of Internet com-
munications to transmit the information more conveniently
have rendered these systems vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Due to the sensitive nature of many industrial applications,
security has become the primary concern in SCADA systems.
More specifically, lack of security considerations in their com-
munication protocols directly compromises the availability,
safety, and reliability of these systems. Our work in this
area shows that machine learning (ML)-based solutions can
introduce new countermeasures to secure these systems.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) Describing the four most popular IIoT protocols, along
with their main communication network vulnerabilities
(Section II).
2) Conducting a vulnerability assessment of IIoT systems,
identifying common malicious threats, analyzing the
severity of the associated risks, and also studying the
applicability of ML techniques to counter these threats
(Section III). This is an essential step to prioritize
required mitigations.
3) Reviewing the research papers that have designed effi-
cient ML-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for
SCADA systems (Section IV).
4) Presenting our own case study, elaborating on the testbed
designed at Washington University in St. Louis, to per-
form real-world SCADA operations, carrying out attacks
(that have not been implemented either for the under-
study or any other IIoT system by other researchers)
against the system, and applying ML-based IDS to
tackle the intrusion detection problem, studying the most
important features in identifying the attack traffic from
normal (Section V).
II. IIOT COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
There are several IIoT data transmission protocols used in
the SCADA systems. However, most of these protocols have
been designed without accounting for cyber risks or security
mechanisms to counter them. The legacy of SCADA started
with Modbus communication protocol which is still the most
widely employed protocol in these systems. Recently, there
has been a trend in moving toward newer protocols such
as Building Automation and Control Network (BACnet),
Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3), and Message
Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT). All four are open pro-
tocols. Modbus was developed as a SCADA-vendor specific
protocol in 1979 [1]. BACnet and DNP3 are standard proto-
cols that were published in 1995 and 1993, respectively [2].
MQTT was developed in 1999 [3].
In this section, we study these four popular SCADA com-
munication protocols along with their main security vulnera-
bilities. Since the main focus of this paper is on the network
susceptibilities of the IIoT, this section has been included to
show where each communication protocol is most vulnerable.
A. Modbus
Modbus is one of the earliest and the most commonly
used protocol in the SCADA systems. The communication is
serial and based on master–slave configuration. Master (e.g.,
HMI) is the device requesting the information and slave (e.g.,
PLC) is the one supplying the information. The master can
also write data on the slave’s memory registers. In a stan-
dard Modbus communication network, there is one master
that can have up to 247 slaves, each with a unique identi-
fication code (ID). There are four tables stored in the slave
device, two for storing digital data and two for numerical
analog data.
Modbus does not provide confidentiality, authentication,
or integrity. Because all Modbus traffic is communicated in
clear text (no encryption is provided), it lacks confidential-
ity, and the content of the packets can be easily seen using
a sniffer tool. Modbus does not provide any public/private
key management, which leads to lack of authentication as
well. Also, there is no sufficient security check mecha-
nism on the traffic, which makes it easy for the attacker to
compromise the integrity of the data. Moreover, a flooding
attack can interrupt the operation of the system and limit its
availability.
B. BACnet
BACnet was primarily designed for building automa-
tion and control systems. This standard is currently under
ASHRAE Standing Standard Project Committee (SSPC)
135. BACnet, like most of the other industrial com-
munication protocols, was not designed with security
considerations.
This standard provides several communication options, such
as Ethernet, token-passing, master–slave, or point-to-point
connections [4]. In SCADA, it is more common to use the
master–slave mode of BACnet.
Due to lack of proper mechanisms for data confidential-
ity, reconnaissance attack is feasible. This protocol does not
provide authentication procedures either. A few cryptogra-
phy mechanisms, e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES) and
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), have been included in
the new versions of the BACnet standard. However, they are
almost never utilized in industrial systems to maintain com-
patibility with the existing devices. Even in new green-field
installations and in general, implementing encryption adds
communication delays and large overheads in the system.
The scan cycle times of PLC and HMI are usually on the
order of milliseconds, and it is not yet feasible to accom-
modate data encryption in the system since encryption and
decryption require a longer time process. In addition, denial
of service (DoS) attacks can be conducted to target the system
availability and halt the service [5].
C. DNP3
DNP3 is another standard network protocol used in
SCADA systems. It was originally designed to be very reli-
able, but it does not provide sufficient security mechanisms.
As a result, most of the DNP3 devices lack authentication,
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encryption, and access control. DNP3 covers the four OSI
layers: 1) network layers; 2) application layer; 3) data link
layer; and 4) physical layer. The communication can happen
in point-to-point mode but mostly happens in master–slave
configurations, and it can include multiple slaves and multiple
masters.
No message authentication is deployed in this protocol, and
hence data integrity is at risk. Eavesdropping and spoofing are
easy as there is no encryption and the data is sent in clear
text. DoS attacks can also easily impact the system’s opera-
tion [6]. The latest version of this protocol that was published
by the IEEE in 2012, provides secure authentication, using
IEC 60870-5 standard [7]. Through this standard, which has
been developed for control systems, the authentication is pro-
vided using digital signatures. However, utilizing public key
infrastructure (PKI) in IIoT devices is not feasible yet. The
complexity that PKI adds cannot be handled by the simple
IoT devices. Further, exchanging the keys, updating the keys,
issuing or revoking certificates and other complexities that
come with using PKI will add a huge delay in the system’s
performance.
D. MQTT
MQTT is an open standard under OASIS and is based
on publish/subscribe configuration. This network protocol has
been very popular in the IoT domain because MQTT mes-
sages are very simple and lightweight. Recently, MQTT has
been increasingly adopted in the ICSs due to its suitability for
remote sensing and control.
MQTT’s topology consists of clients and brokers. At any
particular time, each client can be either a publisher or
a subscriber based on whether they are requesting or sup-
plying data. A broker is an intermediate device between the
publishers and the subscribers to filter out the published
data and send them to their subscribers. Each broker can
handle thousands of clients, which helps the system with
scalability.
No encryption method has been implemented in MQTT,
but transport layer security/secure sockets layer (TLS/SSL)
can be applied on the underlying transmission control proto-
col/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) to provide an encrypted pipeline
for the MQTT messages. However, since this requires a high
level of complexity on the clients, it is not practical to use
in the IIoT devices. Another main security drawback of the
MQTT that originates from its topology is that, if an intruder
steals the identity of a client, it will have access to all other
clients’ data, and not only that specific victimized client.
On the other hand, the broker can be designed to ask each
client for their username and password to allow them to
join the network. However, these credentials will be trans-
mitted in clear text, if no form of encryption is utilized.
For data integrity, MQTT can provide message authentication
code (MAC) techniques such as hash-based MAC (HMAC) to
ensure the received data has not been tampered with. HMAC is
a lightweight cryptographic hash function. However, all clients
who are aware of the secret key can sign or verify the data with
the hash [8].
III. PREVALENT NETWORK VULNERABILITIES
AND CYBER THREATS
In this section, the nine most prevalent attacks in
SCADA IIoT systems and the associated risks are studied.
It should be noted that due to their fundamentally different
nature, the prevalent vulnerabilities and security priorities in
ICSs are different from the ones in traditional IT systems.
Since there has been an extensive discussion on these differ-
ences, and this matter is beyond the scope of this paper, we
refer the readers to [9] and [10].
The confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA, triad)
are the security traits that must be preserved in any system to
keep the data safe. Further, the authentication, authorization,
and accountability (AAA) security controls are the security
tools to protect the CIA traits in the system. In this section,
we study the most prevalent attacks targeting each of these
security elements. Accountability has been left out since it is
generally an administrative aspect.
Our extensive study of relevant works (such as [9]
and [11]–[14]) reveals that these are the most common threats
in the SCADA systems. However, unlike the existing works,
in this paper, we:
1) provide a comprehensive set of prevalent attacks’:
2) define each attack separately regarding which security
aspect they compromise;
3) explain how they impact the IIoT performance;
4) run a risk assessment based on the damage severity and
the likelihood of happening in these specific systems;
5) study the effectiveness of ML-based security solution to
encounter each class of attack.
A. Prevalent Attacks
The attacks are divided into five classes, based on which
security aspects (integrity, availability, confidentiality, authen-
tication, and authorization) are compromised. However, it is
nearly impossible to define a solitary classification because the
classes in which these attacks fall are not mutually exclusive.
Often, compromising one aspect leads to compromising others
as well.
1) Integrity:
a) Buffer overflow: In buffer overflow attacks, the
intruder tries to write large data (more than the designated
size) in the buffer, causing the extra bits to overflow and over-
write other buffers and alter their values. This attack is usually
caused due to poor input type or size validation mechanisms
and makes the system unreliable or even crash.
Buffer overflow attacks are highly prevalent in
SCADA systems due to two main reasons. First, the
majority of the operating systems in ICSs are written in
programming languages such as C, which lacks type safety
mechanisms. Further, SCADA devices operate continuously.
The operating systems that have not been rebooted for
years are more vulnerable due to accumulated memory
fragmentation.
The buffer overflow problem in SCADA systems can affect
both supervisory control and field devices such as sensors.
PLC’s instructions to the output elements (e.g., turning on or
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off the water pumps) and sensed data (e.g., water level) could
be manipulated through this attack [10].
b) Code injection: In a code injection attack, the intruder
tries to execute malicious commands or inject malicious
data into the system. For instance, in a Structured Query
Language (SQL) injection attack, SQL queries are sent to con-
trol or compromise the database server. This attack exploits
the system vulnerability due to the lack of user-supplied input
data validation techniques.
This attack enables the intruder to access sensitive
information such as usernames and passwords, and also alter
the data (e.g., allowing access to an unauthorized user, delet-
ing the data, etc.). A command injection attack can manipulate
the control commands in the system and disrupt the normal
operation.
Since the primary function of the SCADA systems is col-
lecting and storing information, this attack may have a serious
impact on the system. More specifically, if the system is con-
trolled remotely through a Web interface, this attack is able to
compromise the data and the authentication procedures.
c) Improper input validation: This vulnerability is asso-
ciated with the lack of proper mechanisms to validate the
user’s input. This is a more general type of vulnerability,
which could lead to other types of risks. The attacker may be
able to enter wrong values that can make the system unstable.
Moreover, since these systems are not checked regularly due
to their deterministic nature, this attack might stay undetected
for a long time [12].
2) Availability:
a) Denial of service: An intruder carries out a DoS attack
to flood the targeted computer (e.g., PLC and HMI). This
attack disrupts the availability of the SCADA system by send-
ing a large number of random packets to the target node at
a high rate to make the target unresponsive and may even crash
the whole system.
A DoS attack against a SCADA system is generally carried
out by an intruder connected to the network using SYN or
HTTP flooding against a host. SYN attacks are constant fake
synchronize requests, and HTTP attacks are either GET or
POST requests to keep the Web server of the target busy and
not be able to respond to the normal traffic. If the links in the
network are congested, monitoring, and controlling the ICS
will be highly difficult, if not impossible.
Therefore, the main goal of the DoS attack is to hurt the
system’s availability, so that legitimate users are not able to
access the resources.
3) Confidentiality:
a) Reconnaissance: In a reconnaissance attack, the
intruder engages with the SCADA network to gather
information about the system, such as the connected devices,
security policies, IP addresses, host information, etc. After
identifying the elements of the network, the attacker maps
the network architecture to identify the vulnerabilities in the
system. Eventually, the attacker may use this information
to run exploits against susceptible devices to interrupt the
system’s functionality.
Intruders may start this attack using sniffers. They eavesdrop
and inspect the ongoing network traffic to gain information
about the network elements and their status. Stealth scan in
SCADA network can occur on the link between any of the two
nodes of the network; for instance, the link between the I/O
network and the PLC or the link between the HMI computer
and the PLC. This attack is considered passive since the attack-
ers are silent and do not inject any traffic that would expose
them. Although this attack may not be considered severe, the
network information is exposed to an unauthorized person, and
it is very difficult to detect.
4) Authentication:
a) Unauthenticated access: This vulnerability is due to
poor authentication mechanisms in SCADA systems. Since
these systems run continuously and autonomously, personnel
may not change their usernames and passwords regularly. They
may even use default usernames and passwords for ease of
remembering [11]. Brute force methods or logging the user’s
keystrokes can be used to obtain this information. Furthermore,
phishing attacks have been conducted widely to collect the
credentials of ICS operators [12]. If the attacker somehow
figures out these credentials, he can misuse his access and
conduct other types of attack.
Since under this category, we solely consider “accessing”
the data, in which usually root access is not granted. We
have classified this attack as low impact. Otherwise, they will
be categorized in more severe attack types such as directory
traversal.
b) Man-in-the-middle: In the man-in-the-middle attack,
the intruder eavesdrops on the communication links and tries
to compromise the messages between two nodes while the
nodes think they are still talking to each other directly. For
instance, the intruder may send malicious commands to the
actuators pretending to be the PLC or send false responses
from the sensors to the PLC. Further, the intruder may discard
or manipulate messages. This type of attack will have a valid
syntax code; hence, rule-based IDS will not be able to identify
it from the message format [15]. This type of attack can be
mostly prevented through encryption techniques.
5) Authorization:
a) Directory traversal: In this attack, the intruder tries to
access the restricted directories or files that are supposed to be
root access only. This vulnerability is due to poor filtering or
validation mechanisms for user-supplied inputs. Poor directory
listing control is another cause of these attacks. In this type
of attack, the intruder will be able to download sensitive files
and information from the system.
This attack often also results in compromising other vulner-
abilities in SCADA systems such as confidentiality, since the
attacker might access private files in the system. Proper input
validation methods can prevent this type of attack.
b) Backdoor: In a backdoor attack, the intruder tries to
find a way around the authentication process to enter the
system. Through the backdoor access, the attacker can log
into the system, reach all the data and files on the system,
and execute commands. Backdoor installation on the victim
system may be done by an insider. Once installed, it is very
difficult to detect this type of attack, and it is considered highly
dangerous since it grants the intruder full access to the system.
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Fig. 2. Risk assessment matrix of prevalent vulnerabilities in IIoT.
In the case of ICSs, some of the vendors and manufacturers
have backdoor accounts into their products for remote support
and updates [16]. This vulnerability puts the system in danger,
and in case of a successful attack, all the SCADA data will
be exposed to the intruder.
B. Risk Assessment
As discussed in the previous section, different prevalent
attacks have different severity and different rates of recurrence.
We have built a risk assessment matrix for these vulnerabili-
ties, which is shown in Fig. 2. In this assessment, the impact
and the likelihood of occurrence of the prevalent attacks are
combined for integrated analysis. The matrix in this figure
has been designed based on our study of the prevalent vul-
nerabilities and the severity of the risks associated with them.
Vulnerabilities have been arranged in the matrix in the order
of their likelihood and impact severity. It is important to men-
tion that this order in the presented risk assessment matrix is
based on our experience and judgment, and it might slightly
differ from case to case or for different applications. However,
it becomes a convenient tool for future studies.
Since we have picked the most common attacks, the like-
lihood is classified into three high levels of occurrence:
occasional, likely, and certain. Similarly, the level of impact
has been classified as mild, moderate, or critical. The overall
risk ranking has been color coded. Threats that have severe
negative impacts and are likely to occur frequently receive the
highest rank, shown in the red color. Attacks with both low
impact and low likelihood have the lowest rank, shown in the
green color. And the yellow colored attacks fall between the
two other classes. This risk assessment specific for the IIoT
helps in identifying the threats that have the greatest overall
risks and must be the top priority to address in these systems.
For instance, code injection is shown in red due to the catas-
trophic results of command manipulation in SCADA systems
and their high probability of occurrence. DoS attacks that often
occur would result in the termination of the system’s opera-
tions. The reconnaissance attacks that harm the confidentiality
may or may not lead to any negative consequences in the
system’s function.
C. ML as Versatile IIoT Security Tool
IDS has been widely used as an effective security
mechanism to counter intrusions. Misuse-based IDSs such
as rule-based, signature-based, flow-based, and traffic-based
methods are just some examples of conventional IDSs. Since
traditionally, most of the connections and traffic in the
SCADA networks were predefined; these types of IDS were
successful in detecting abnormal activities. For instance, when
the intruder builds new connections to the victim or sends
a different type of traffic, there will be unusual data flows in
the network [17].
However, considering frequent upgrades in the networks,
resulting in regular changes in the topology, the legacy IDSs do
not perform properly. Also, to counter new types of attacks that
appear every day, or in scenarios where the attack is planned
intelligently (e.g., the man-in-the-middle attack), smart IDSs
are required.
IDSs are, in general, helpful whenever the intruder affects
the network data flow. This is true even for ML-based IDSs.
If the intruder does not interact with any of the network
elements, it is very difficult even to become aware of the intru-
sion. However, to launch attacks or compromise the network
activities, the intruder has to disrupt the network somehow.
The ability of ML algorithms in detecting small anomalies
distinguishes them from any other type of IDSs.
ML algorithms can detect anomaly patterns that are difficult
for humans to discover. To provide a secure network, the ML-
based IDS can be designed with a moving target. This ability
of ML models to learn and evolve is valuable because the
attacks are constantly evolving, and new vulnerabilities are
discovered every day. This is another reason why signature-
based IDSs are becoming obsolete, and anomaly based IDSs
using ML are the new trend. We now discuss the suitability
of ML-based IDS for each of the security elements.
1) Integrity: ML can be very helpful as a detection tool
against data integrity threats. By training an ML-based IDS
with legitimate traffic data, the IDS will learn the normal
data that flow in the system. For instance, in the case of com-
mand injection, ML will detect the malicious queries that are
out of the ordinary in the system. This specialized IDS is able
to recognize the source that is compromising the integrity of
the data to block him from the system to maintain the trustwor-
thiness of the data. Hence, by learning the common behavior
of the system, the ML-based IDS can be very useful against
the attacks targeting this security element.
2) Availability: ML can be very useful in detecting the DoS
attacks. A proper ML algorithm can detect specific charac-
teristics of the attacks targeting the availability, for instance,
detecting the sources with unfamiliar or broadcast addresses,
the ones that are showing abnormal behaviors, nodes that are
sending an unreasonable amount of traffic, or when the nor-
mal operational traffic stops because the HMI or the PLC are
flooded and unavailable.
Even though a simple network analyzer can detect the
DoS attacks, it still requires a human operator to analyze the
network logs. On the other hand, the ML-based IDS will not
only provide proper automation but is also not prone to human
error. Moreover, it has been shown to be effective in detecting
this kind of out-of-ordinary behaviors.
3) Confidentiality: In this type of attack, if the intruder
merely eavesdrops on the network traffic (i.e., does not send
any traffic nor build a connection with the devices in the
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network), it is very hard to detect using ML. As mentioned
before, when the attacker’s behavior does not change the
network flow, it is very hard to detect the attack with any tech-
nique, including ML. However, as soon as the intruder engages
with the network, a ML powered anomaly based IDS will be
able to recognize the abnormal behavior of the attacker trying
to snoop or asking for unusual information from other nodes
in the network. However, after engaging with the network, the
malicious activities go beyond a simple eavesdrop attack and
are classified under other attack categories.
4) Authentication: As mentioned before, authentication is
a security control technique. Attacks targeting this security ele-
ment need to find a way around to bypass this step. To counter
these threats, it will be more efficient to use prevention tech-
niques rather than detection methods. For instance, encryption,
strong passwords or key management techniques can be uti-
lized to prevent unauthenticated access. Even though these
techniques have their weaknesses, they improve the system’s
robustness against unauthenticated access.
5) Authorization: Activities that do not match with the
normal traffic pattern even from verified users can be iden-
tified using ML techniques. Some examples include executing
abnormal commands, manipulating the sensors and actuators,
or sending random traffic on the network. If the intruder runs
zero-day attacks or occasionally accesses the system, he might
stay undetected for a while, but he will eventually be exposed
by an ML-based IDS. However, the sensitivity of the learning
technique must be high. The IDS learns the normal conditions
of the system and will reveal abusive commands, unauthorized
users, or intruders.
The IDS would raise the alarm each time it detects an abnor-
mal behavior from a user in the network that must be verified
by the operator. Raising the sensitivity of the utilized ML to
detect these attackers will increase the number of false posi-
tives (normal traffic classified as attack traffic). Nevertheless,
in security matters, it is better to be overcautious keeping the
IIoT network safe. A false negative (undetected attack) could
result in a higher cost than a false positive in the critical
infrastructures.
IV. EXISTING MACHINE LEARNING-BASED IDSS
As we discussed in the previous section, since ICSs are
different from regular IT systems, their communication type
and even prevalent cyber vulnerabilities differ from a regular
IT network. Consequently, it is important to consider these
differences and design specific IDSs for SCADA systems.
In this section, we review available ML-based IDS
approaches solving different security vulnerability issues of
SCADA IIoT systems. Some of the presented research works
focus on various security aspects. In this case, the first time
that we mention their work, a detailed description is pro-
vided; following that in the other sections, just brief mentions
are made.
A. Integrity
Beaver et al. [18] employed six different types of ML algo-
rithms, I Bayes, random forests (RFs), OneR, J48, non-nested
generalized exemplars (NNge), and support vector machines
(SVMs). Their dataset consists of labeled remote terminal
unit (RTU) telemetry data from a gas pipeline system in
Mississippi State University’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Center. The attack traffic is generated from two types of code
injection sets, command injection attacks and data injection
attacks. Seven different variants of data injection attacks were
tried to change the pipeline pressure values, and four differ-
ent variants of command injection attacks to manipulate the
commands that control the gas pipeline.
Ullah and Mahmoud [19] suggested an IDS using a combi-
nation of J48 and I Bayes techniques. J48 is a type of decision
tree (DT) technique. They have used the same dataset as the
previously mentioned research work in [18]. The J48 classifier
was first used as a supervised attribute filter. Then, the I Bayes
classifier was used to develop the anomaly based intrusion
detection.
Alves et al. [20] employed the k-means technique, which is
an unsupervised clustering algorithm. An open-source virtual
PLC (OpenPLC platform) along with AES-256 encryption is
used to simulate a SCADA system. They have conducted three
different types of attacks against their system, code injection,
DoS, and interception (eavesdrop).
He et al. [21] used conditional deep belief network (CDBN)
to detect attacks in smart grids. They have simulated their
system using IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus test systems. They
also provided a comparison of their method with SVM
and artificial neural network (ANN). They considered false
data injection attack that is aimed at the integrity of data.
B. Availability
Potluri et al. [22] designed a hybrid IDS using SVM, and
deep belief networks (DBNs) for industrial networked control
systems. They have used the NSL-KDD dataset, which is an
old dataset and is not specific to ICSs but consists of DoS and
integrity attacks.
As mentioned in Section IV-A, Alves et al. [20] studied
conducting DoS attacks as a part of their dataset to train
their IDS.
C. Confidentiality
Keliris et al. [23] used SVM in their simulated testbed
in MATLAB controlling Tennessee Eastman (TE) chemical
process. They have conducted reconnaissance attack as vul-
nerability discovery technique, and further, tried to study
the effect of command injection attack on the controller to
manipulate the reactor pressure.
As mentioned in Section IV-A, Ullah and Mahmoud [19]
covered confidentiality problem through reconnaissance attack.
Alves et al. [20] (mentioned in Section IV-A) also worked
on eavesdropping attacks. Their unsupervised training methods
were able to detect these attacks successfully.
D. Authentication
The research work [20] was mentioned previously. The
authors also declare that due to the utilization of encryption,
their system is resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks.
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Eigner et al. [24] employed k-nearest neighbors (KNNs)
on a custom-built conveyor belt system. They used the nor-
mal behavior of the system to design an anomaly based
attack detection approach. They studied the performance of
the system with different k’s and different distance measure-
ment metrics. They have focused on man-in-the-middle attacks
as the intrusion scenario.
E. Authorization
We could not find any work covering this area of intru-
sion detection for SCADA systems using ML techniques.
Therefore, in this paper, we focus on unauthorized intrusion
detection in our case study. More specifically, we have con-
ducted backdoor attacks on our SCADA IIoT testbed. The
details are provided in Section V.
F. No Specific Attack
Yasakethu and Jiang [25] studied the advantages and disad-
vantages of four different types of IDSs, rule-based, ANN,
hidden Markov model (HMM), SVM, and one-class SVM
(OCSVM). However, they do not provide any implementation
nor any practical analysis of these techniques.
Zhang et al. [26] have used SVM to detect anomalies in
network traffic. They have generated their dataset using sim-
ulations of the IEEE 118 bus network. Six features of traffic
(magnitude and phase of the current, magnitude, and phase of
voltage, real power, and reactive power) were extracted from
the data. In that paper, the normal condition was defined as
when no equipment is disconnected from the system, and there
is no fault in operation. The fault condition is defined as a short
circuit occurrence somewhere in the system. No cyber-attack
was conducted against the system.
Skripcak and Tanuska [27] have designed a multiagent
architecture for SCADA systems to monitor the plant
processes using passive-aggressive online ML algorithms. The
focus of the paper is to provide the theory behind forecasting
based on the current situation.
Siddavatam et al. [17] employed DT and RF techniques.
Their system prototype has been built in their lab. They have
extracted several features from the traffic for training such as
TTL (time to live), byte count for response type, word count
for query type, packet type, and the reference number for query
type. To generate abnormal behavior in the system, changes
in operation were conducted through a control node, but no
attacks were developed in the system.
Maglaras and Jiang [28] used OCSVM as their proposed
anomaly based IDS. They declared that OCSVM is a good
choice because the dataset is imbalanced. The authors have
used only two features of traffic (data rate and packet size)
of an electric grid. The trained model did not include any
malicious attack data, and the trained dataset was captured
during normal operation of a SCADA system.
Mantere et al. [29] have focused just on feature selections
in designing an anomaly based detection. They have chosen
features such as flow directions, individual packet sizes, pro-
tocol, average packet rates, average data byte rates as the most
TABLE I
AVAILABLE ML-BASED IDS FOR ICS VULNERABILITIES
determining features. The traffic was captured from two dif-
ferent locations within an industrial site. However, no attack
data were considered in this paper.
G. Summary
Table I provides a summary of this section. In this table,
the available ML-based anomaly detection approaches in
SCADA are classified based on the type of their targeted
vulnerabilities. This table provides a concise overview of
where the most focus of the research works available in the
literature is.
As shown in this table, we could not find any ML-based
research work in authorization aspects of SCADA security.
Hence, we have focused on this area in the next section.
V. OUR CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe our testbed and the evalua-
tion results of our proposed ML-based IDS. The problem of
intrusion detection in the IIoT systems is explored. To detect
manipulated commands, system’s transactions were logged
and used to train the ML algorithms. We start this section by
introducing our prior work and how this paper is different, then
the details on the testbed implementation, conducted cyber-
attacks, and then the designed IDSs and their performance
evaluations.
A. Our Prior Work
In [30], we have presented the effect of imbalanced datasets.
Even though ML has proven its capability in intrusion detec-
tion, there are cases that it falls short. Severely imbalanced
training datasets where the number of attack data is sig-
nificantly lower than normal data (e.g., less than 1%) is
a real-world challenge that is quite common in IIoT security.
In [31] and [32], we have investigated IDS design using
ML and ANN models for securing the confidentiality and
availability (reconnaissance and DoS attacks) of the system.
However, in this paper, we have improved our testbed by
adding the following elements.
1) Turbidity alarm and turbidity sensor have been embed-
ded in the testbed to add analog input to the system.
This helps us investigate overwriting analog registers
(turbidity level of the water) in the PLC.
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Fig. 3. Scheme of our implemented testbed.
2) Backdoor, command injection and SQL injection attacks
are used to study the authentication and data integrity
aspects of the security for these systems.
3) New metrics have been used to evaluate the performance
of the trained model. These metrics represent the quality
of the performance with better granularity.
4) Feature importance ranking study has been conducted
to show which features are the most salient ones in
distinguishing the attack traffic from the normal.
B. Our SCADA IDS Testbed Implementation
Industrial companies almost never release their network
data, because they are obligated to follow confidentiality laws
and user privacy restrictions. Hence, real-world IIoT datasets
are not available for security research in this area. In the IIoT
security domain, the researchers usually have to use commer-
cial or public datasets that are not specific to this domain. In
this paper, we developed a real-world testbed that resembles an
actual industrial plant. We have conducted real cyber-attacks
against the system to gather realistic datasets containing both
normal and attack traffic analogous to real industrial network
traffic.
We have picked an IIoT system that supervises the water
level and turbidity quantity of the water storage tank, shown
in Fig. 3. This system is a part of the water treatment and dis-
tribution process in industrial reservoirs. This testbed includes
components like historical logs, HMI, and PLC. There are
three sensors and four actuators in this testbed. Two water level
sensors and an analog turbidity sensor compose the inputs.
A three-light turbidity alarm, a valve, and two water are the
actuators that receive the commands from the PLC. Also, there
are control buttons (on, off, and light indicator) for manual
control of the system. A detailed explanation of the testbed
and its elements can be found in our previous work [30].
In short, the task of this testbed is to keep the water level
between two predefined levels. At the same time, it measures
the turbidity level of the water and illuminates one of the
red, yellow or green lights of the turbidity alarm, based on
the cloudiness level of the water. Modbus was utilized as
TABLE II
OUR BUILT DATASET STATISTICAL INFORMATION
the communication protocol in our testbed since it is one
of the most popular IIoT protocols commonly used in the
ICSs. The logic of the PLC is programmed using the Ladder
language [33], [34].
C. Our Attack Scenarios
Since, to the best of our knowledge, no research paper has
focused on ML-based IDS in SCADA systems for backdoor
attacks, we conducted these attacks along with two other types
of cyber-attacks. We have generated SQL injection and com-
mand injection attacks to have a larger variety of attack records
in our dataset. These attacks were carried out using the Kali
Linux Penetration Testing Distribution [35]. All the data gen-
erated during the attack phase as well as the normal traffic
was gathered and recorded by Argus [36] and Wireshark [37]
network tools.
An important point that should be mentioned here is that
we have deliberately built our dataset to be imbalanced. The
percentage of attack traffic in the dataset is less than 0.2%.
This assumption makes the system as similar as possible to
the real-world ICSs. The statistics of the dataset are shown in
Table II, where the average data rate was 419 kb/s, and the
average packet size was measured as 76.75 bytes.
A brief explanation of how these three attacks disrupt the
normal operation is provided next.
1) Backdoor: In this attack, our target is the HMI system,
which gets infected with a backdoor virus. This virus works
in the background and is hidden from the SCADA system’s
operator. The backdoor virus opens a port in HMI allow-
ing a remote connection to be established with the attacker’s
PC. Thus, the attacker gains full access to the HMI computer,
where the SCADA system is installed. Using the backdoor,
the attacker can explore the HMI system and download any
file, including the dataset with all the sensor and actuator val-
ues. In this attack scenario, we (as the white hat attacker)
transferred about 1GB of files containing sensitive information
from the HMI to the attacker’s PC. We ran this attack several
times to get the status of the system in different situations.
Further, using this attack, we built new directories in the
SCADA system and removed several files to disrupt the HMI
operation.
2) Command Injection: In this attack, the target is the
PLC. First, the attacker’s PC connects to the network and is
able to read all the PLC register values and logs them into a .txt
file. After gaining access to the PLC register information, the
attacker rewrites some of the PLC registers that are vital to the
physical process. For example, while Pump 2 was supposed
to draw water from the tank, we (as the white hat attacker)
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stopped it, started Pump 1, and the water flowed out from the
tank. Another instance is when we turned on the wrong tur-
bidity alarm light, in the way that, while the turbidity level
was high, and the red light was supposed to be on, we (as the
attacker) turned off the red light and turned on the green light
instead.
3) SQL Injection: In this attack, both HMI system and
PLC device are targeted. They both have Web servers for
setting up and accessing their configuration and information.
In this attack, the attacker’s PC sends database queries to
submit untrusted data. We (as the white hat attacker) sent mali-
cious SQL commands which were executed on the database.
We ran this attack many times and logged all the network
traffic.
D. Feature Selection
An important step in training the ML models is selecting
and extracting features from the traffic. Here, in designing our
IDS, we chose the features that their values change during
the attack phases compared to the normal operation phases. If
a selected feature does not vary during the attacks, then even
the best algorithm will not be able to detect an intrusion or an
anomalous situation using that feature.
In our study, we reviewed the potential features and chose
23 features that are common in network flows and also change
during the attack phases. Table III shows the chosen features
along with their description.
How each feature varies depends on the type of attack.
For instance, during the normal condition, where there is no
attack, the SrcPkts and DstPkts features mostly show a peri-
odic behavior. On the other hand, during attacks, these features
show random behavior.
Further, we have studied the importance of the features.
They are ranked based on how salient they are in helping
the algorithm distinguish the normal traffic from the attack
traffic. In this technique, the values of each feature are per-
muted randomly one at a time, creating new datasets. The
ML model is trained on these datasets, and the increase in
classification error is measured for each. If the increase is
high, then the feature is important, and conversely, if it is
low, the feature is considered as not important. For each fea-
ture, the “model reliance” or importance coefficient is defined
as the ratio of the model’s error value after permutation
to the standard error value when none of the variables are
permuted. For more detailed information, we refer readers
to [38] and [39].
As we report later in this section, RF has shown the best
classification performance, so we have picked this algorithm
to calculate the importance. In Fig. 4, the top five important
features in our dataset along with their normalized (so the
total of 23 feature importance values sum to 1) importance
coefficient are shown. While these are the top five features, the
threshold for the importance has shown that all the 23 features
are required for training.
E. Machine Learning Techniques
In this case study, the ML-based IDS is designed just as
a binary classification to decide whether a particular traffic
TABLE III
SELECTED TRAFFIC FEATURES IN OUR PROPOSED IDS
Fig. 4. Top five important features.
sample is an attack or normal. The inputs to the IDS are the
23 chosen features, as mentioned in the previous section, and
the output of the IDS is either 0 (normal traffic) or 1 (attack
traffic). Also, for a total of 451 372 traffic samples, we use
the ratio of 80% to 20% to divide the dataset into training and
testing sets, respectively.
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TABLE IV
CONFUSION MATRIX IN IDS CONTEXT
TABLE V
CONFUSION MATRIX OF RF CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
We have used and tested seven different techniques for the
IDS; SVM, KNN, naïve Bayes (NB), RF, DT, logistic regres-
sion (LR), and ANN. We have used the Keras library [40] to
build the ANN, and for the other algorithms, the scikit-learn
library [41] was utilized to develop the learning models for
the IDS. The models are trained and tested over the data col-
lected in the testbed, and the results of their performance are
compared.
F. Performance Metrics
Traditionally, the performance of the ML algorithms is mea-
sured by metrics which are derived from the confusion matrix.
Table IV shows the confusion matrix. The description of the
matrix confusion parameters is as follows.
1) True Negatives (TN): This represents the number of
normal packets correctly classified as normal.
2) True Positives (TP): This represents the number of
abnormal packets (attacks) correctly classified as attacks.
3) False Positive (FP): This represent the number of normal
packets incorrectly classified as attacks.
4) False Negative (FN): This represents the number of
abnormal packets (attacks) incorrectly classified as nor-
mal packets. As an example, we picked the RF model to
show its classification results in the form of confusion
matrix in Table V.
Based on the confusion matrix, the metrics used in this
paper to evaluate the performance of the ML algorithms are
as follows.
1) Accuracy: This shows the percentage of the correctly
predicted samples considering the total number of
predictions
Accuracy = TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN × 100. (1)
2) False Alarm Rate (FAR): This represents the percentage
of the regular traffic misclassified as attacks
FAR = FP
FP + TN × 100. (2)
3) Undetected Rate (UR): The fraction of the anomaly
traffic (attack) misclassified as normal
UR = FN
FN + TP × 100. (3)
Fig. 5. Accuracy.
4) Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC): Measures the
quality of the classification. MCC shows the correla-
tion agreement between the observed values and the
predicted values
MCC = TP × TN − FP × FN2√(TP + FP) × (TP + FN) × (TN + FP) × (TN + FN)
× 100. (4)
5) Sensitivity: Also known as the true positive rate. A sen-
sitive algorithm helps rule out an attack situation with
more confidence when the predicted data is labeled as
“normal.” While sensitivity and the UR are comple-
mentary, each shows a different aspect of performance
interpretation. If the focus is on minimizing FN, we
would want to increase the sensitivity of the model as
much as possible (close to 100%), so that a smaller
number of attacks stay undetected. Meanwhile, UR
represents the fraction of these FN samples
Sensitivity = TP
TP + FN × 100. (5)
Accuracy (1) is the most frequently used metric for assess-
ing the performance of binary classifiers. However, this metric
is not sufficient for evaluation in scenarios with imbalanced
classes (i.e., one class is dominant and has more training
data compared to the other). In our case, which is an IDS
scenario, the proportion of normal traffic to attack traffic is
very high resembling a realistic dataset. This case is also valid
where detecting rare anomalies is crucial like fraudulent bank
transactions and identification of rare diseases. Therefore, in
addition to the accuracy, we use other metrics evaluating the
performance in a more meaningful way.
G. Results
In this section, we present the numerical results of our
algorithms detecting the attacks described in Section V-C.
Fig. 5 shows the accuracy results (1). While RF shows the best
performance and NB the worst, accuracy is not the best met-
ric to evaluate the performance. As it was mentioned before,
in scenarios like intrusion detection, the algorithms are biased
toward estimating all the samples as normal. Even if an algo-
rithm detects all the samples (even the attack ones) as normal,
the accuracy will still be high, since the attack samples consist
of a very small part of the dataset.
The FAR, shown in Fig. 6, represents the percentage of the
normal traffic being misclassified as the attack traffic by the
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Fig. 6. False alarm rate.
Fig. 7. UR.
Fig. 8. ROC curve.
model (2). Fig. 6 shows good performance for all the models
except NB. However, even this metric alone cannot truly rep-
resent the performance. Since the number of normal traffic is
considerably higher than the attack data, and also the models
are biased to label almost all the test data as normal (due to
the imbalanced training dataset), the FAR value is expected to
be low.
UR metric can assess the performance better in spite of
the imbalanced data. As shown in Fig. 7, UR represents the
percentage of the attack traffic that is misclassified as normal
(the opposite of the FAR) (3). Since this metric considers only
the attack traffic, the fact of having an imbalanced dataset
does not impact the evaluation. LR has the worst performance,
even compared to a detector that would randomly assign true
and false to each traffic packet, which would lead to 50%
UR with an infinite number of packets. However, RF showed
the best performance. This metric is more critical than FAR
because it is related to the attacks not being detected by the
system.
Fig. 8 shows the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve. This curve basically plots the TP rate versus the
Fig. 9. MCC.
Fig. 10. Sensitivity.
FP rate for each model. As depicted, while RF shows the
best performance, LR has the worst performance. The poor
performance of LR for this metric is due to the low TP rate
of the model in detecting abnormal traffic.
MCC (4), shown in Fig. 9, is considered to be one of
the best metrics for classification evaluation, and it is gener-
ally a better performance representative compared to the ROC
curve and other metrics. As shown in this figure, RF has the
best MCC value, while NB has the worst. MCC is consid-
ered as a fair metric when it comes to evaluating ML models
that were trained with an imbalanced dataset. Since this met-
ric represents the correlation agreement between the observed
values and the predicted values, it is less affected by severe
imbalanced ratios.
Finally, the sensitivity metric results (5) are shown in
Fig. 10 to evaluate how sensitive each model is in react-
ing to an abnormal situation. As seen in the figure, RF
and NB have the highest sensitivity, while LR shows the
lowest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cyber-security of the IIoT devices is critical. There
is still a huge gap in providing adequate security for these
systems, which is why it is crucial to focus on the industrial
aspect of IoT technology. ML solutions and big data ana-
lytics have been widely used to ensure a secure platform
in the IT systems. However, due to the fundamental differ-
ences and dissimilar priorities of ICS and the traditional IT
systems, their prevalent cyber-risks are different. Thus, spe-
cial attention is required to provide security for IIoT. Through
our discussions and experimental evaluation, we have demon-
strated the effectiveness of ML for the security of these
systems.
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In this paper, we first studied the four most common proto-
cols used in SCADA IIoT along with their security susceptibil-
ities. Afterward, we carried out a risk assessment of the most
important and prevalent vulnerabilities of the SCADA IIoT
systems, and how ML-based solutions would be useful to com-
bat them. Following that, a literature review on the existing
anomaly detection approaches for SCADA systems using ML
was provided to show where there is still a need for provid-
ing security. In the last section, we presented our case study
and presented how ML is capable of filling the identified gap
by handling new types of attacks such as backdoor, command
injection, and SQL injection. Feature importance ranking was
also studied to highlight the most salient features in distin-
guishing the attack traffic from the normal traffic. The testbed
built for this research work was designed to be as similar as
possible to real-world IIoT scenarios. Special attention was
also paid to evaluate the performance of the system using
better representative metrics.
As our future direction, we plan to focus on utilizing a joint
design of multiple algorithms to achieve better performance.
The hybrid model should be able to provide more accurate
results compared to any of the constituent models. False neg-
atives, even a low number of them, mean malicious exertions
against the system that stayed undetected and could lead
to catastrophic results. Hence, reducing the number of false
negatives is what we plan to concentrate on.
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